

The Ukraine Fiasco - Paradox of Color Revolution and Helpless Pawn Sandwiched between Global Powers

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Abstract: In this paper, colour revolution across the world has been studied with a primary focus on Ukraine. Ukraine is a territory that is extremely important to Russia. It is here where Nazi Germany, mighty Germany, and Napoleonic France all crossed to attack Russia directly. It fulfills the role of being a situation of enormous fundamental significance for Russia. The main accusation against the Ukrainian crisis is Russian hostility. The main issue is NATO augmentation, in order to entice Ukraine away from Russia and toward the West. This highlights the occasion's relevance presently while clarifying the occasion's historical background. While NATO has been in its constant endeavor to reach the borders of Russia via Ukraine through a bundle of strategies, Russia under Putin doesn't seem to be accepting it. As a result, the common citizens have become a scapegoat for the unending power struggle.

Index Terms: Color Revolution, USSR, Ukraine, NATO

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND: UKRAINE

The conventional wisdom in the West holds that the Ukrainian crisis is primarily the result of Russian hostility. The argument makes the case that Crimea was annexed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and may eventually target other Eastern European nations as well as the rest of Ukraine as part of a long-standing drive to rebuild the USSR. This hypothesis states that Viktor Yanukovich's ouster as president of Ukraine in February 2014 simply served to mask Putin's plan to arrange for Russian powers to maintain some degree of control over a region of Ukraine. However, this record is false because the United States and its European Union are jointly responsible for a substantial portion of the situation. The main issue is NATO augmentation, which is the centre of a bigger plan to entice Ukraine away from Russia and toward the West. Key elements at the same time included the EU's expansion to the east and the shift in Western policy to support Ukraine's transition to a majority rule system following the Orange Revolution in 2004. Russian officials have vehemently resisted NATO expansion since the middle of the 1990s, and most recently they have made it clear that they wouldn't stay while their vital neighbour became a base for the West. The illegal overthrow of Russia's ally and democratically elected president of Ukraine, which he accurately described as an "upset," was the final straw for Putin [1]. He invaded Crimea in retaliation, a promontory he believed would hold a NATO naval station, and attempted to destabilise the nation up until it gave up trying to create an alliance with the West.

UKRAINE: DURING AND BEFORE SOVIET RULE

We should examine Ukraine's experiences before analysing the Orange Revolution as a favour to a majority that controls the government and metropolitan social-political growth. This clarifies the occasion's historical context while highlighting its relevance now. Knowing more about historical events also helps to better understand contemporary developments. Before and throughout the Soviet era, Ukraine struggled to understand its place in the world. Their fortress in Ukraine was strengthened by similarities to Russia on the social and phonetic levels. More rooted external powers were removed and had an impact on the state's growth arrangements from the outset when Ukraine was independent and striving for popularity-based improvement [2][3]. Despite this, Ukraine has a good motive to improve majority rule. Before the agreement with the Soviet Union, Ukraine saw a few occupations. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ruled Western Ukraine for more than 200 years, followed by the Habsburgs in the 1790s and Austria-Hungary in 1867 for the duration of World War I. In 1917, Ukraine briefly enjoyed freedom. Ukraine was divided among Russia, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia by the Treaty of Versailles. The Soviet Union occupied Ukraine toward the end of World War II. The final half of the 1700s and the middle of the 1800s saw the rise of written and artistic expressions of Ukrainian patriotism. Attempts at "de-Ukrainization" were possible in Eastern Ukraine from 1863 to 1876. Restrictions were imposed on speaking Russian. Ukrainian organisations aimed to protect Ukrainian traditions and culture while opposing boycotts [4]. Scholars and patriots in Ukraine discussed the importance of upholding and preserving public character in distributions and verse. Due to supremacy, this group of intellectual elites felt forced to support and preserve all parts of Ukrainian culture in order to prevent assimilation and disappearance. During the various occupations, the Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church fostered unity among the populace. The holy locations contributed to maintaining a sense of place and safety. Joseph Stalin considered that religion throughout the Soviet era hampered his plans for complete Sovietization. He had to adapt to every society in the nations that helped to create the Soviet Union and abolish theology. Stalin put limits on the oneness between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. In 1946, this led to the collapse of the Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church, which fled into exile in Ukraine. Meanwhile, unwavering foreign drilling was done openly. The results were severe and included being sent to work camps in Siberia, assuming discovered practising confidence. In the 1980s, the Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church made a comeback. Before the retention of the Russian Orthodox Church many years earlier, the Cathedral of St. George in Kyiv was restored by August 1990 as the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church that it had been. In 1925, the USSR was completely under Stalin's power. He intended for

communism to make the Soviet Union a formidable force. Without regard to price, he had to exceed the remaining world in terms of modern, agricultural, and financial creation. In October 1928, Stalin announced his Five-Year Plan and limited public support. He demanded impossibly high grain standards, which were opposed by many Ukrainian farmers and people struggling with digestion. As some of the parts began to seem out of reach, every staple was snatched. The outcome was death through hunger, which led to the Great Famine of 1932–1933 and the deaths of 11 million people (Subtelny, 1994, 416). Up to World War I, Ukrainian scholars and their patriotic endeavours continued in Kyiv and Lviv. For refuge, many escaped to Western Ukraine while they advanced and upheld every aspect of Ukrainian patriotism. As the start of World War I and the Russian Revolution made this increasingly challenging, astute individuals like the preservation of the Ukrainian language was the emphasis of Lesya Ukrainka and Ivan Franko's work. They were aware that preserving the Ukrainian language would make it harder for experts to digest pure Russian. To preserve Ukrainian patriotism while living under Soviet cover, reforms were recognised by Ukraine's political elite in the 1950s. Using language, writing, culture, and collective memory to uphold patriotism kept with group affiliation. To counter the 1950s exercises, major Russification efforts were made in the 1960s and 1970s. Boycotts against practising any religion persisted. In the 1980s, Ukrainian nationalism was once again prevalent. The "Well-known Movement for Restructuring," or Rukh, succeeded in uniting people and conveying strength via patriotism while emphasising its importance inside the state. Popular music was used to convey their message, quickly catching the teen's attention. Following the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in April 1986, Soviet attitudes among Ukrainians grew stronger. The terrible consequences subsided within a few days. By 1990, about 5,000,000 people had joined Rukh, many of whom had left the Communist Party of Ukraine. Western Ukraine provided the gathering's fortification, igniting a nationalistic spirit across the entire nation. Rukh was propelled by intelligent people, and he later had assistance from all groups and socioeconomic groups both inside Ukraine and in the Diaspora abroad.

THE WESTERN AFFRONT

Soviet leaders want NATO to remain intact and U.S. forces to remain in Europe as the Cold War drew closer, believing that this would maintain peace in a unified Germany. However, they and their Russian replacements accepted that Western ambassadors understood their interests and didn't think NATO should grow any larger [3]. In the 1990s, the Clinton group began promoting NATO expansion because it had certain suspicions. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic took part in the initial amplification in 1999. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia participated in the second one, which was held in 2004[15]. Moscow continued to rant angrily. During NATO's 1995 besieging campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, Russian President Boris Yeltsin remarked, "This is the basic indicator of what could happen when NATO moves straight up to the Russian Federation's borders. The same fight could flare out across the entire of Europe." However, given the chance to thwart NATO's eastward march, the Russians were utterly unable. This was bad since, with the exception of the tiny Baltic states, none of the new alliance members provided Russia with a frontier. After that, NATO focused on the east. The alliance discussed abandoning Georgia and Ukraine at the end of its meeting in April 2008 in Bucharest. George W. Shrubbery's group supported it, but France and Germany opposed it because they believed it would unnecessarily irritate Russia. Members of NATO eventually came to an agreement: rather than beginning the formal registration cycle, the alliance published a statement endorsing the objectives of Georgia and Ukraine and forcefully stating, "These states will become individuals from NATO." Moscow, in any case, didn't think the outcome was a particularly noteworthy split difference [1]. "Georgia and Ukraine's participation in the alliance is an enormous key blunder which would have very significant repercussions for skillet European security," declared Alexander Grushko, then Russia's delegate unfamiliar priest. Putin insisted that joining NATO would eliminate an "immediate danger" to Russia if those two countries joined. In a conversation with Bush, Putin reportedly "straightforwardly indicated that Ukraine will cease to exist" according to a Russian newspaper. Given Georgia was invaded by Russia in August 2008, one might be slightly sceptic about Putin's promise to avert Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO. Mikheil Saakashvili, the president of Georgia, made the decision to reintegrate South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the late spring of 2008. Saakashvili was adamant about having his nation admitted to NATO. Putin, in contrast, wished to isolate Georgia by keeping it away from NATO. When a confrontation between the Georgian government and South Ossetian separatists broke out, Russian forces took control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow has reached a significant turning point. Despite this unequivocal warning, NATO never voluntarily gave up on its intention to include Georgia and Ukraine in the coalition. Additionally, NATO proceeded to expand itself, and in 2009, Albania and Croatia gained independence. Additionally, the EU is advancing towards the east. In May 2008, it presented its Eastern Partnership initiative, a strategy to promote economic integration and prosperity in nations like Ukraine [5]. Naturally, Russian pioneers believe that the deal puts the advantages of their nation in danger. In February of last year, before Yanukovich was once again, the EU was allegedly trying to establish a "range of prominence" in eastern Europe, according to Sergey Lavrov, the foreign minister of Russia. Russian pioneers think that after NATO expansion, EU expansion is the next logical step. In order to distance Kyiv from Moscow, the West has worked to advance majority rule in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states. Typically, this tactic involves giving money to Western people and organisations. The US has paid more than \$5 billion to Ukraine since 1991, stated Victoria Nuland, the co-secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, who made the estimate in December 2013. [9] As part of that effort, the American government has provided financial support to the National Endowment for Democracy. Carl Gershman, the head of the NED, called the funding of more than 60 programmes aimed at enhancing Ukraine's common society "the highest honour." After Yanukovich won the presidential election in Ukraine in February 2010, the NED came to the conclusion that he was undermining its objectives. It consequently grew even more determined to aid the opposition and fortify the organisations that uphold majority rule. When Russian pioneers witness Western social design in Ukraine, they are concerned that their nation may soon follow suit. These feelings of dread are not unfounded either. "Ukraine's decision to join Europe will hasten up the death of the concept of Russian dominion that Putin addresses," Gershman published a piece in The Washington Post in September 2013[11]. Putin may face horrible consequences both inside and outside of Russia, he continued, adding that Russians also have a choice to make. [9].

CREATE A CRISIS: The three Western strategies that increased the fire for holding to the light were NATO expansion, EU enlargement, and the development of the majority rules system. The pivotal moment came in November 2013, when Yanukovich

opted to accept a \$15 billion Russian counteroffer in place of a significant financial arrangement he had been negotiating with the EU. This choice led to anti-government protests that intensified over the ensuing three months and resulted in the murders of one hundred nonconformists by the middle of February. Western messengers flew hastily to Kyiv to determine the urgency of the situation. On February 21, a deal between the government and the opposition allowed Yanukovich to hold control until fresh elections[12]. It quickly fell apart, though, and Yanukovich departed for Russia the following day. The newly elected government in Kyiv, which was led by four senior figures who could be classified as neo-fundamentalists, was vehemently pro-Western and fiercely hostile to Russia. [11] Washington clearly supported the overthrow, even though the extent of the US role has not yet been made clear. Republican Party Senators Nuland and John McCain took part in presentations concerning state adversaries, and Pyatt, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, declared that the day of Yanukovich's fall was "a day for the set of experiences books." Arseniy Yatsenyuk, a politician from Ukraine, was elevated by Nuland to the position of senior state leader of the new administration after a phone tape leak revealed a change in control. It shouldn't be shocking that Russians, of all peoples, think the West was involved in Yanukovich's downfall. A chance to take action against Ukraine and the West had presented itself to Putin. He asked Russian authorities to annex Crimea from Ukraine shortly after February 22, and soon after that, he integrated it into Russia. Due to the large number of Russian soldiers who had previously been stationed at a naval base in the Crimean port of Sevastopol, the task appeared to be relatively straightforward[14]. Since around 60% of Crimea's population is of Russian ethnicity, it also made for an apparent target. Most of them were looking for someone from Ukraine. Putin then put a lot of pressure on Kyiv's newly elected government to keep it from supporting the West against Moscow, making it quite plain that he would destroy Ukraine as a functioning state before he would permit it to serve as a bulwark for the West near to his home. In order to achieve that goal, Putin has supplied the Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine with advisers, weapons, and other assistance. If the administration starts to have serious concerns about the dissidents, he has amassed a substantial force on the Ukrainian border and is getting ready to launch an attack. Furthermore, Putin demanded instalment payments for earlier items and explicitly raised the cost of the gas that Russia sells to Ukraine. Putin has just started to work.[8]

THE DIAGNOSIS

It shouldn't be difficult to comprehend Putin's conduct. Ukraine serves as a birthing environment of critical importance to Russia. Napoleonic France, Great Germany, and Nazi Germany all traversed Ukraine to assault Russia. A tactical partnership that advanced into Ukraine while Moscow's human opponent would not be tolerated by any Russian leader. No Russian leader would also permit Ukraine to be governed temporarily by the West in order to facilitate its incorporation into the West. Although Washington dislikes Moscow's situation, it must comprehend why it exists. Defining geopolitics Amazing abilities are frequently susceptible to dangers in their immediate environment. In general, distant extraordinary powers are not allowed to put military forces in the western hemisphere, much less close to American borders. Imagine the shock in Washington if China attempted to accuse Canada and Mexico of forming a potent military alliance[10]. Abandoning the rationale, Russian authorities have regularly complained to their Western friends about NATO's incursions into Georgia and Ukraine, as well as any attempts to turn those nations against Russia. The 2008 crisis between Russia and Georgia also aided Stone in comprehending this message. Russian authorities should understand that NATO has no plans for it, according to US and its European partners, who claim that they did a good job of allaying Moscow's concerns. The alliance has consistently denied that its expansion was meant to bind Russia and it has never permanently delegated military power to its new members. It even established the NATO-Russia Council in 2002 to promote collaboration. The United States declared in 2009 that it will initially deploy its new missile defence system aboard battleships in European oceans rather than on Czech or Polish soil in an effort to placate Russia. The Russians continued to aggressively oppose NATO expansion, notably in Georgia and Ukraine, therefore none of these attempts was successful. Additionally, rather than the West, the Russians will finally decide what poses a threat to them. To comprehend why the West, notably the United States, failed to recognise that its Ukraine strategy was laying the foundation for a significant conflict with Russia, one needs to look back to the mid-1990s when the Clinton group started advocating NATO extension. Several reasons for and against expansion were put out by intellectuals, but no solution was agreed upon. For instance, the majority of eastern European immigrants and their families who immigrated to the United States strongly backed the expansion because they thought NATO should defend nations like Hungary and Poland[9]. Some realists supported the plan as well since they thought Russia needed to be restrained. In order to keep the peace in a reunified Germany as the Cold War came closer, Soviet authorities wanted that American forces stay in Europe and NATO to remain operational. They acknowledged, along with their Russian successors, that Western ambassadors recognised their concerns and disagreed that NATO should expand [6][7]. The Clinton group started advocating for NATO enlargement in the 1990s because it had some misgivings. The initial phase of expansion began in 1999 and encompassed the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second event, which took place in 2004, had Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia as participants. Moscow whined furiously the whole time. For instance, Russian President Boris Yeltsin cautioned that if NATO reached the Russian Federation's borders directly during NATO's bombardment operation against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995, "the same kind of battle may flare out across entire Europe." But at the time of NATO's eastward expansion, which did not appear to be very dangerous given that none of the new members provided Russia with a border, save from the minor Baltic states, the Russians were too weak. NATO then turned its attention to the east. While it was at its greatest in April 2008 in Bucharest, the coalition considered sacrificing Georgia and Ukraine. George W. France and Germany opposed it, despite the Shrub Group's approval, since they thought it would unnecessarily irritate Russia. The NATO members ultimately came to an agreement.

CONCLUSION

It's also crucial to remember that revolutions have historically been recognised as being modular. In conclusion, the four aforementioned conditions must all be met for the colour revolution to qualify as a modular phenomenon. This is because it was discovered that these four requirements were shared by all three colour revolutions. The main issue is NATO augmentation, which is the centre of a bigger plan to entice Ukraine away from Russia and toward the West. It was the last straw that made Putin lose his cool, and he described the unconstitutional overthrow of the duly elected and allying Russian president of Ukraine as an "upset." We

should examine Ukraine's experiences before analysing the Orange Revolution as a favour to a majority that controls the government and metropolitan social-political growth. Authorities from the US and its European allies argue that they did a decent job of allaying Russian scepticism, which Moscow should understand that NATO has no plans for it. Intellectuals advanced some arguments in favour of and against growth, but there was no consensus on what to do. A few pragmatists also favoured the tactic since they believed that Russia should have been confined during the Cold War nearby, Soviet pioneers preferred that the U.S. In the 1990s, the Clinton group began promoting NATO expansion because it had certain suspicions.

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