

Somalia's Federal Odyssey: External Forces, Hurdles, and the Quest for Democratic Governance

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Abstract- This paper delves into Somalia's federalism, tracing its historical roots from post-Barre upheaval to contemporary debates. Amidst civil unrest, regional peace-building efforts culminated in a federal system. The study dissects domestic and external factors shaping federalism, critiquing its flaws, especially the undefined power division. It explores historical context, dating back to pre-independence Digil-Mirifle clan advocacy. Debates on federalism are analyzed, contrasting views on its potential to address abuse or threaten unity. Drawing from Somali perspectives, including scholars and politicians, the paper navigates ongoing discourse and the clan system's role. Ethiopia's influence is explored, examining external impacts on governance. The study scrutinizes arguments for and against federalism, considering historical events, regional dynamics, and power struggles. It concludes by examining the international community's role, highlighting motivations behind supporting federal structures to address conflict, enhance inclusiveness, and mitigate clan power contests. In summary, the paper provides a comprehensive analysis of federalism in Somalia, exploring its historical evolution, contemporary debates, and the intricate interplay of domestic and external factors in shaping governance.

Keywords: Federalism, Power distribution, Federal Member States, Constitution

1. Introduction

After Barre's regime was ousted from Mogadishu in 1991 by armed opposition movements, namely USC (United Somali Congress), SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement), and SNM (Somali National Movement), Somalis entered years of protracted civil war and political conflict. As Mogadishu became a battlefield for warring factions, including clan militias, warlords, and Islamist groups, there was a need for some form of regional-level peace-building process that could facilitate restoring law and order and building stable autonomous regions. Even though there were united efforts coming in and out that attempted to re-establish the Somali nation-state and restore peace and stability, unfortunately, none were successful for a number of reasons. The complexities and difficulties of statelessness necessitated a dysfunctional federal system based on a top-down state-building approach. Political struggle and civil war led to the adoption of the federal system (Powell, Ford, & Nowwastreh, 2008). The lack of a clearly defined division of powers and responsibilities between the Federal Government and the so-called Federal Member States is one of the primary flaws of this federal system. The system's adaptability is further diminished by the inability to predict a power distribution acceptable to FGS and FMS.

Before the formation of the Somali Republic, which constituted the union of two regions, British Somaliland Protectorate and Italian Somaliland, there were advocates of federalism hailing from the Digil-Mirifle clan family. Mukhtar (1989) mentions that an independent constitutional party was lobbying to have some form of a decentralized or federal system. This party was encouraging the establishment of constitutional-based autonomy or federal regions to ensure democracy, which could unite various Somali tribes, each of whom has primitive traditional and tribal systems (Mohamud, 2016). This was not taken into account in Somalia since it appeared to be a plot to partition the country and was not supported by either society or the administration (Ibid, 56-57). After Somalis experienced Siyad Barre's long-term repressive dictatorship in 1991, they felt the necessity of power distribution due to fear of power abuse and a centralized authoritarian system based in the capital, which dictates to people without consulting them. On one hand, power-sharing willingness that came from suffering people during the dictatorship pushed this model of federalism; on the other hand, external actors were involved in the imposition of the system with the help of some local politicians. However, most Somali nationalists argue that this is a divisive policy towards Somalia.

Some African countries embraced this system. Sheikh Ali, Dahir, & Zahra (2019) concur that the countries that adopted some form of a decentralized or federation system are marked politically inefficient, including Ethiopia, South Africa, Nigeria, Malawi, Senegal, and Uganda. Kalu (Nd) contends that the opposed descriptors linked with federalism make it difficult to understand what "true federalism" is because it continues to vary in specifics. However, he also underscores the ambiguities associated with the term "federalism." The ambiguity can be both legal and political. Due

to the lack of a clear political and legal framework in Somalia, which would define roles and authority at the federal and state levels, the country sometimes descends into chaos. Additionally, a broad agreement on decentralized authority and responsibility needs to be constitutionalized to avoid recurrent conflicts between FGS and FMS. Balthasar (June 2014) notes, "With the endorsement of the provisional constitution on 1 August 2012 by Somali's National Constituent Assembly, the country formally embarked on the implementation of the federal formula." He further mentions that there is an ambiguity over which political entity controls the process of establishing Federal Member States. But the argument saying who has the legality of establishing a new FMS has been passed because currently within Somalia no region stands alone. But constitutional affiliated conflicts over the use of power, elections, and resource sharing remain constant.

Despite the fact that federalization in Somalia was fully achieved in 2012 when President Hassan Sheikh took office, this newly adopted form of government still faces many opponents and critics from various levels of society, including academics, religious individuals, traditional leaders, and civil society. On the other hand, another portion of society comprises the aforementioned levels, with many politicians supporting the system. The politicians against the system argue that the day Somalia moved into federalism is the day decision-making was taken out of the hands of genuine Somali politicians who might bring a solution to major critical issues rather than giving regional powers (Ali, 2015). Unlike African countries, Somalia is supposed to be the only nation-state that largely lived with homogeneous people in terms of culture, religion, and language in northeastern Africa. With respect to this, the most tangible argument opposing the system is in line with homogeneity to which Somalis belong exclusively. Proponents of federalism argue that just homogeneity can't prevent going to the federal system (Muhumed, 2020).

This study aims to look at the history of the domestic factors driving federalism and also the external imposition of the federal system. It assesses different perspectives regarding its applicability in Somalia's socio-political context. In addition, it attempts to impartially analyze the different views for and against federalism. This paper extensively employed secondary data, including published papers, media accounts, and books, supplemented by observations by the author.

2. Contemporary Debates over Federalism in the Somali Context

Federalism is a political organization that integrates separate states within existing systems to maintain its coherence (Britannica, 2020). It is, however, a system of government that achieves constitutionalized power division among various government levels (Bulmer, 2017). Bulmer (2017) argues that federalism is the consequence of culturally diverse people living in a given region or a territorially large country to keep it united. He further states that federalism has the advantages of ensuring peace, stability, and mutual accommodation in countries that have territorially concentrated differences of identity, ethnicity, religion, or language. Bulmer's contextualization of federalism is evident, but he has neglected certain significant primary circumstances that may have created the system. He elaborated on two main contexts that federalism considered; "identity federalism" and "Efficiency federalism". However, the first one is based on differences and diversity among national communities, and the second is basically concerned with the demand for fundamental needs, usually service delivery (education, health, resource control) and also political participation.

Okhonmina (2006-2007) contends that there are "political variables" that may bring federalism. He explains that federalism typically varies from one political system to another. He suggested that the position of the federation determined two extremes of the continuum, what he calls maximum and minimum federations. He mentions that there are two opposed federations, centralized federalism in which the rulers of the federal government dominate decision-making and have excessive political power, and peripheralized federalism characterized by a bottom-up political system where constituents and subordinate units take a greater role in making all political-related decisions. The discussion over the best form of governance for Somalia is likely to fall somewhere between these two diametrically opposed federations, or it may be another model with a decentralized structure or, to some extent, a middle ground.

According to what Somalis aim to practice, this system is more likely to avoid over-concentration of power in the capital, but the issue of diversity has nothing to do with the application of federalism in the Somali context. Even though the slight dialectic difference between what used to be called Maay and Maxa tidhi cannot be overlooked, it may not also be a central cause of the formation of this system. Elmi (2015) argues that Somalis are much more willing to have access to basic services and a more decentralized approach, which reduces the degree of dependency on the capital when it comes to certain issues. However, he underlines that the demand for democracy and the call for an equitable share of resources are the most important issues that drive people's attitudes toward federalism. The former minister of the interior, Abdi Saed Juxa pointed out that those who are against federalism and the provisional constitution are always arguing about which kind of federalism is adopted and said that there is no definite one; He mentions that the type of federalism is defined, moreover, it is parliamentary, and Bicameral which the power is extremely decentralized (Juxa, 2019). His opinion on federalism no longer differs from those held by the majority of Puntland politicians. Apparently,

there is no deeply grounded conceptualized argument that Juxa and others who are championing federalism have put in place.

Despite the fact that this model has some support right now, there are significant reasons that prevent getting consensus:

1. First of all, the majority of Somalis hold the view that this model is the only one that facilitates foreign interference and must be abandoned.
2. Another key crucial issue is frequent disagreements over elections, resources, and power-sharing.
3. The flaws of the model became evident, as it heightened clan demands for new states. For instance, every clan aspires to have its own flag and federal member state, further dividing the country into clan fiefdoms. For example the issue of Benadir State, Khatumo, Hiiran, Gedoland and Awdal.

Due to a combination of criticisms, some Somalis regard federalism as a transitional stage during which temporarily awaited the restoration of a strong central government and then permanently moved into a centralized system. Professor I. M. Lewis and James Mayall suggested that there are four governance models which may be relevant to resolving outlined Somali social and political crises. However, these are confederalism, federalism, consociationalism, and decentralization (Lewis & Mayall, 1995). They further assessed the suitability of adopting confederalism which they highlighted is compatible with Somali traditional values but most Somalis disagreed with this concept even though some of them might have supported it. If you look at Somali scholars, they are absolutely divided on which governance model is applicable to Somali politics; for example, a well-respected Somali scholar Professor Hussein Tanzaani argues that a confederal system between Somaliland and Somalia should be used in order to keep them united since Somaliland proclaimed secession (Adam, 1993-1994). On the contrary, there are a number of Somali intellectuals who had a different perspective than that of Hussein, but the fact is that none of these models is considered superior or worse; therefore, the suitability of the given model in a specific country needs to be studied deeply. Most recently, Heritage annual forum for ideas meeting at Garowe, Deputy Prime Minister Mahdi Guleed expressed that the federal system must be negotiated as it will be in the future. However, he notes that northerners (former British protectorate, Currently de facto state) argue to have some form of federalism between south and north also he pointed that the Digil-Mirifle clan family has a different view than that of northerners which is saying to have a federal system between them and the rest of Somalis at large on account of dialect difference (Guleed, 2020). As long as no group is successful in persuading others of their point of view, the discussion over opposing proposals appears to go on forever.

According to Warsame, he claims most developed countries including America Canada, Australia, and Switzerland use this system of governance (Federalism) or some decentralized form, however, from his point of view, federalism is not the problem but recommends its application in the Somali context has to be understood. Abdi Hosh held the view that federalism is designed to keep the unity of diverse groups as in the case of Ethiopia's ethnic federalism (Jibriil & Warsame, 2018). According to Idaaja (2017), federalism has brought many problems to Somali politics simply because it is mainly based on tribalism so each clan sees itself as a government and they are not willing to accept anything less to act as an independent state; they do not call themselves regional administrations rather claiming that they are member States. However, he adds that federalism has weakened the sovereignty of the country since the regional administration leaders often make diplomatic relations with some foreign countries without reporting to the center what they negotiated with those foreign countries. The currently re-elected president of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, was the first president of the post-transitional government in Somalia in 2012 has fully completed the establishment of the federal states during his first reign and faced many challenges pertaining to the border demarcation between newly established Federal states, structuring power distribution between FGS and FMS. Although the provisional constitution gives FGS the authority to control monetary issues, national defense, immigration, foreign relations, and citizenship, it underscores that other issues must be consulted collectively. Most Somali scholars and politicians have questioned the applicability of the current federal structure, and they still do. It appears that its opponents successfully expressed their dissent.

3. The Somali Clan System and Federalism

The role of clannism and identity in the current political system is quite conspicuous. Undoubtedly, Somalia's federalism is based on clans and lineage patronage. Uluso (2014) contends that clan-based federalism is worse than any other factor, such as the 4.5 formula, Islamic movements, and even the notorious dictatorship ruling Somalia from 1969 until 1991. He further states that the state-building process is not essentially meant to form and implement federalism in Somalia but to restore Somali sovereignty and re-establish state institutions by consolidating all state powers dispersed among different clans.

According to a survey conducted by the Heritage Institute, it reveals that federalism is the best option to achieve a power-sharing mechanism among clan lines (Heritage, 2015). This reflects the fact that clans and clan politics have a significant impact on this federalism that is inconveniently implemented in Somalia. Nonetheless, this form of government is bolstering the primitive clan ethos, which may be preventing any meaningful societal change that would allow for the advancement and modernization of the state and its institutions. However, a major factor seriously eroding

state institutions is the over-reliance on the clan system as a means of determining a nation's political structure (Ahmed, 2020).

By the way, the clannistic feature of this system was a major factor in the opposition and resistance it faced from many Somalis; therefore, the clan's contribution to its adoption cannot be underestimated. Abukar Arman (2012) notes that so-called federalism "virtually institutionalizes the Balkanization of Somalia into clan fiefdoms without any clear territorial size or borderline." There were a number of factors that compelled them to move through with this shift from a highly centralized system. According to Elmi, who has written extensively on the subject, came to the conclusion that the Somali people's lack of trust, which is made worse by fragmentation, is what is driving this system's willingness. Second, the need for basic services and decentralization are crucial factors that make this type of administration necessary (Ibid, 2015).

It's important to note that what most Somalis think about is whether it is federating clans or citizens. Zoppi's article titled "Federating Citizens or Clans," surprisingly is about the persistent questions people have about the current system; the title, however, implies inferentially what made the system function (Zoppi, 2018). Since Somalia's social structure, conflict, and state failure have been looked at through primordial and instrumentalist theoretical models (Anderson, 2012). However, there have been quite substantially different analytical theories regarding kinship and clan systems. According to Gaas (2018), Somali's clanship is a long-lasting yet estranging organizational principle underpinning the conflict where it is difficult to harmonize conflicting clannish interests. Following this, the primordialist argument is that having centralized authority in Somalia is impossible (Lewis I. M., 1998). Additionally, the main force pushing federalism is escalated mistrust among Somalis inherited pre-colonial clan conflict, post-colonial unjust treatment, and successive atrocities against civilians that the military regime had committed. Abubakar (2016) argues that, unlike federal nations in Africa, Somalia's federalism is intended to satisfy contradictory clan interests but addresses neither ethnic diversity nor large territory. His argument describes the inevitability of realizing that the clan is quite instrumental in whatever is related to the establishment of Somalia's federalism at the local level. Though clans dominated any political sector in the country, there is little hope of getting institutionalized powers that can neutralize the clan factor. As every nation in Africa has faced social problems, whether ethnic or religious diversity or perhaps another course of tension, one can say Somalia's social problem is definitely clan confrontations, even though it is not as worse as I. M. Lewis exaggerated in his seminal works on Somali studies. Clan conflicts are undoubtedly Somalia's social problem, despite the fact that they are not as severe as some non-Somali scholars portrayed. Every country in Africa has had social problems, but clan confrontation and rivalry are the major problems in Somalia.

4. Ethiopia's Role in Founding Clan-based Federalism in Somalia

Despite a long and hostile history between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Ethiopian government has actively meddled in Somalia's domestic affairs since the collapse of the Somali State in 1991. Their troops have entered Somalia's territory on numerous occasions without permission from the Somali government and captured cities near the boundary shared with Somalia. Elmi & Barise (2006) note, "Ethiopia, a powerful and well-positioned state, is a hostile neighbor that aims to maintain a weak and divided Somalia"; it destroyed the Cairo accord in 1997 and the Arta peace conference outcome with the help of prominent Somali warlords.

Politicians backed by the Ethiopian government have introduced the idea of a federal Somalia, the majority of whom declined to take part in the largest peace conference held in Djibouti. Colonel Abdillahi Yusuf was encouraged to reject the outcome of the peace conference held in Cairo in 1997 where twenty-eight Somali warlords attended to reach an inclusive political agreement about power-sharing (ibid, 2006). After all, the Ethiopian government had openly supported him to establish some form of administration for his clan's territories. Additionally, it later helped him to run as Somalia's presidential candidate, which he won due to massive interference and all kinds of manipulations of the electoral process from the hosted government [Kenya] and the Ethiopian regime as well.

The hidden agenda of both neighboring countries was to shift the federal system to Somalia through clan leaders, politicians, warlords, and prominent figures who were able to campaign for the federalism concept. Both neighboring countries that govern the Somali regions were compelled to play a key role in dividing Somalia into clan parts with a fear that a strong Somalia may attempt to reclaim those territories (Dahir & Sheikh Ali, 2021).

A building-blocks approach was formerly specifically used by Ethiopia to deal with clan-owned provincial administrations. Many Somalis believe that the current clan-based federalism is more likely the ethnic federalism that Ethiopia adopted in early 1994 and has been borrowed from it. Elmi pointed out that the contradictory views among Somali political elites can be divided into two: "Some, particularly the leadership of the aspiring regions, and neighboring states, would prefer to establish almost independent clan states by keeping the central government extremely weak or non-existent. Others emphasize the importance of the unity of the country and therefore prefer a system that would not reify existing clan divisions."

Put another way, politicians that favor empowering independent subnational entities are either serving neighboring states' interests at the expense of their own nation or are unable to foresee the consequences if the central government loses its dominance over subnational entities. Puntland State continues to support the political conspiracy of the Ethiopian regime, which is based on a kind of peripheral federal system where the power of the central government is more distributed. Contrarily, in her federal model, the Ethiopian government was a major proponent of a top-down, more centralized federal system that constrained the functions delegated to federal member states. Ethiopia and Kenya saw a potential risk of seeing one Somali nation-state; therefore, to prevent that, they must involve constructing a weak Somalia to take advantage and balkanize it into clan portions.

When it was at its height, the UN Security Council issued a warning against Ethiopia's blatant meddling in Somalia's affairs. It supplied arms for different functions fought in different places. The UNSC also suggested refraining from interfering in Somali political matters and the supply of illegal weapons that might trigger a conflict (UN, 2016). However, Ethiopia and Kenya's political goals were to keep Somalia in a precarious and fractured state. As a result of their interference, the situation in the country deteriorated, and the partition of the Somali territory continued. When the international community, notably the UN, shed light on how things were going and the direct sabotage from the Ethiopian regime, the TPLF administration tended to deliver their conspiracy policy through the African Union and IGAD to weaken Somalia. The establishment of some federal member states has even been mandated by the IGAD and AU.

5. Somali's Federal System: Opponents vs Proponents

Following the overthrow of the Siad Barre Regime, the idea of federalism emerged (Barawaani, 2015). There has been unintended willingness among Somali politicians, academics, elders, and civil society regarding having a decentralized form of government that effectively addresses respective major domestic concerns as the situation of the country in general worsened, in particular, the conflict in Mogadishu. However, there isn't a consensus on which decentralization model would work best in the Somali setting and be more appropriate to use. Thus, it is important to consider different perspectives for and against federalism. According to politicians' perspectives, they can be divided into two distinct camps: those who genuinely support this system and some others who consider themselves nationalists and are against it. One of the supporters was Mr. Abdilkadir Zobe, a significant minister in the first post-colonial government (Dahiye, 2014). Moreover, some who are greedy and clan-oriented played a significant role in putting the plan of federating Somalia into action, including the former president of Somalia, Colonel Abdillahi Yusuf, who was a clan function leader before his presidency. According to Roble (2019), one of the first political leaders to fervently endorse, fight for, and disseminate this philosophy of federalism was Abdullahi Yusuf. When he came to power in Somalia, he put it into practice. Well before his presidency for the transitional federal government, he was the president of the Puntland self-autonomy region. While some Somalis praised him for doing this task, others claimed that he was instrumental in moving Somalia toward an unspecified externally-driven system. Abdirahman Faroole, the former president of Puntland State, and Saed Deni, the current president, along with all other political elites from Majerteen [the Darood sub-clan], are willing to excessively expand FMS's powers through constitutional review while continuing to be a major roadblock to the creation and adoption of a thorough federal constitution. In contrast, while terminating FMS's ad hoc diplomatic agreements with both regional and international organizations, both President Hassan Sheikh and former president Farmajo continued to appear to have a unitary mindset and frequently downplay the FMS's authority.

If you take a close look at those who were vehemently defending centrifugal tendencies, you may find that their arguments were supported by legitimate grievances about the massacres, evacuations, and acts of clan cleansing that took place in Mogadishu after the Siad Barre regime fell, leading to the deaths of many innocent men, women, and children. This is what Lidwien Kapteijns described as organized "clan cleansing" and vengeance on supporters of the regime (Kapteijns, 2013). Meanwhile, opponents have only emphasized the rhetoric of nationalism, Somaliness, unity, and social cohesion, which has been put to the test for some time. However, these anti-federalist groups were unable to explain their position and offer any valid justification for the events that occurred in the north in 1988, Mogadishu, and elsewhere in 1991. However, to a certain degree, both groups present different arguments. However, there is a noteworthy emphasis on establishing the central system with a power-sharing model, particularly endorsed by the majority of elites in Mogadishu. Conversely, elites in Garowe diverge significantly from this viewpoint, placing a strong emphasis on the federalism system, which they believe is not only valuable but also the sole credible representation for Somalia's survival, even if it comes at the expense of internationally led initiatives (Ibid, 2015 p11).

Additionally, from the perspective of academicians, a substantial and contentious debate between self-rule and shared rule is prevalent in the academic realm. Although some people might support either of the two opposing extremes, proposals and arguments in favor of a middle ground are also valid. Thomas (2017) notes that "Many scholars have advocated for various forms of power-sharing in states emerging from violent conflict to provide governance structures that can promote inter-ethnic cooperation, local political empowerment, and effective institutions that can reduce the likelihood of re-escalation. Other academics have warned about its shortfalls, arguing it could harden social divisions and prove difficult to implement in weak states that have poor local and national institutions required to make federalism

effective.” The majority of Somali scholars who may be considered anti-federalists advocated for a federal system with appropriate power division, but limited authority delegated to subnational units is essential. Hussein Adam's edited book "Mending Rips in the Sky" discussed the significance of decentralizing authorities in Somalia and how it may be managing that transition successfully when the US/UN attempt to reestablish the central government failed. Ahmed Samatar (2013) suggested that a decentralized unitary state is the best option that Somalis can choose. Numerous intellectuals agreed with him, including Afyare Elmi, Abukar Arman, Abdi Samatar, and former director of HIPS Abdi Aynte and others. Faisal Roble contends, however, that federal member states should take precedence over the center. Academicians, with the exception of I. M. Lewis and James Mayall, who offered confederalism as an option, do not generally support his arguments regarding the applicability of federalism in Somali politics.

6. International Community: Why and How?

Pressure, largely external, for adhering to vertical power division has been a key instrument in developing federal structure patterns. According to Keil (2012), federalism has become an important tool used to resolve conflicts; the states that failed to stop civil war and ravaged intra-clan warfare should adopt it. Since collapsed states face severe fragmentation, this system legitimizes the search for unity. The primary objective of the international community in supporting this system is fundamentally concerned with three issues, namely power devolution, enhancing political inclusiveness, and finally de-escalating clan contestation over power and resources. International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), donor countries, and other significant external political actors explicitly supported efforts to advance the federalization process as a means of improving the security situation as well. None of these goals can be achieved through a centralized system in which one clan has complete control of the government and can use its authority to oppress others, as the Somali people experienced under the Siyad Barre regime. Basically, if a centralized unitary system becomes stronger, it could produce an autocratic regime at any point without certainty. Therefore, dispersing power into the hands of multiple stakeholders may reduce the likelihood of the emergence of an authoritarian system. Those interested in the consolidation of democracy view federalism as complementary to it, but many argue that federalism cannot guarantee the practice of democracy as well as good governance. Additionally, the donor community has directly encouraged the formation of sub-nationals and even worked with them over the past two decades due to the incapability of subsequent central governments. The US once employed a "Dual Track" policy, allowing the US government to deal with sub-states. In 2010, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson noted that the "essence of the dual-track policy is that the US would deal with central states and sub-states simultaneously to advance peace and development in Somalia" (Carson, 2010). Elmi (2011) argues that this policy empowers clan division since it deals with every established administration, which literally represents clan interests as an independent state. Decentralization, federalism, and other models about the structure of government are aimed to:

6.1 Widen Political Space, Participation and Inclusiveness

In this era of globalization, neoliberalism, and market-oriented governance, the role of the government has kept pace with these fast-changing concepts. In response to this, old-fashioned managerial approaches have been discarded, necessitating the adoption of new managerial approaches that adhere to these structural and situational changes. However, the concepts of New Public Administration (NPA), New Public Management (NPM), and Public Choice Theory have been introduced to advance the government's efficiency and public interest. The themes of social equity, gender, responsiveness, accountability, participation, and inclusiveness have been popularized. In this context, Somalia is among the underdeveloped countries forced to subscribe to these concepts through aid conditions by international organizations, namely the World Bank, IMF, and European Union Commission. Accommodating these socio-political shifts and integrating into the world economy, the international community has emphasized the establishment of political inclusiveness, allowing each citizen to participate in the decision-making process. Federalism, which appreciates the concepts of shared rule and political autonomy, extends opportunities to citizens to participate in politics at the national, state, and local levels (ushistory.org, 2023). Social participation will encourage bottom-up accountability and give marginalized and minority groups in society the ability to influence the policies that affect them. In theory, federations are adopted to preserve and integrate variations of social groups. However, it attempts to collectively promote citizens' actions towards practicing democratic norms. Gerken (2010) advocates that federalism has numerous benefits, including its acceptance of minority rule. He concurs that federalism promotes competition and participation.

6.2 Strength Democracy and Culture of Power Sharing

Early on in human civilization, monarchic and oligarchic systems of government predominated, concentrating power in the hands of a small number of individuals. Those who lived under these systems of government felt the sting of arbitrary use of power. Perhaps this was the time when many people stood against this system, leading to its final demise in many parts of the world. It was the democratic systems of government experimented within the post-monarchical epoch that later developed and became the most influential political system endorsed by people and intelligentsia (History of Democracy, 2023). In this time of modern states, democracy has become a core indicator for development.

It has a significant interaction with the country's economic growth and development (Boutros-Ghali, 2002).. Democracy upholds values of liberty, freedom of choice, collective decision-making, majoritarian views, equal power sharing, free press, and competition. Federalism may also have the benefit of sustaining the smooth operation of democracy (Filippov & Shvetsova, 2013). The linkages between federalism and democracy can be looked at in different dimensions. Democracy is often assumed to be a precondition of federation. In most occasions, a democratic institutional setup can affirmatively host the concept of federation and decentralization. Power separation, which prevents any detrimental power control, usually accentuates the logic of checks and balances, which is very important in modern governmental settings. Conventionally, democracy represents a ruling system that is formed on the basis of the society's will and endorsement through elections; however, its interface with federalism is concerned about autonomy and a broadening culture of decentralizing power at a lower level. The center, which possesses the final, supreme power, delegates some of its power to the states.

6.3 Preserve Unity

Federalism can be described as one of the governmental patterns aimed at resolving tensions stemming from complex linguistic, religious, ethnic, and cultural differences. It seeks to establish a unified social entity and is widely acknowledged for its instrumental role in holding together a country with a large territory and diverse population. States that persist in separatist ideology are often granted extensive self-government. Nivola (2005) holds the view that if Belgium had not granted Flanders some form of self-rule and Italy to the Sardinian island, there would probably be violent separatist movements that could dissolve the unity. In the Somali context, federalism tends to sustain the cohesiveness of fragmented regional units and clans. It attempts to give legitimacy to regionalism and territorial fragmentation based on clannism. Here, the question is how Somalia would look if its provisional constitution doesn't stipulate the adoption of federalism. For instance, the Puntland administration, which existed before the adoption of federalism, would have been a unique phenomenon.

7. Conclusion

After Barre's regime was ousted from Mogadishu in 1991 by armed opposition movements, namely USC (United Somali Congress), SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement), and SNM (Somali National Movement), Somalis entered years of protracted civil war and political conflict. Prolonged statelessness pushed the country to adopt a dysfunctional federal system. The application of the concept of federalism in Somalia had not been consulted with civil society and concerned indigenous stakeholders; instead, it has been built through a top-down approach. Contrary to the intended goal of avoiding over-concentration of power in the capital, the study suggests that the issue of diversity has little relevance to the application of federalism in the Somali context. The research identifies that clans and clan politics have a massive influence on the federalism applied to Somalia. While federalism tends to address conflicting clan interests, it is not effectively utilized to promote efficiency and service delivery. Furthermore, the study examines the domestic factors driving federalism and the external imposition of the system by Ethiopia, Kenya, and the international community. From the perspective of the international community, federalism has become an important tool used to resolve conflicts in states that have failed to stop civil wars and intra-clan warfare. Its adoption aims to widen political space, encourage participation and inclusiveness, strengthen democracy, foster a culture of power-sharing, and preserve unity.

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